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SEMI-STRONG FORM MARKET HYPOTHESIS: 
EVIDENCE FROM CNBC'S JIM CRAMER'S 
MAD MONEY STOCK RECOMMENDATIONS 
By Elizabeth Dodson 
Department of Finance 
Faculty Mentor: Dr. Craig Rennie 
Department of Finance 
Abstract: 
Mad Money has become one of the most popular shows on 
CNBC. The host, Jim Cramer, has an outlandish style and 
personality that viewers find intoxicating. Cramer's goal for the 
show is to make people money. Does he succeed? This paper 
finds that investors can expect to gain above-average, risk-
adjusted returns by following Cramer's stock recommendations 
and trading accordingly. These findings challenge the semi-
~trong fonn market h)pothesis. According to this hypothesis 
mrestors should not recogni::e gains trading on public infonnation 
~ince it st~tes that the market has already adjusted prices for that 
uiformatwll. It also contributes to current literature by providing 
analysis on the different segments of the Mad Money program 
and serving as a jumping-off point for future research on a 
possible Jim-Cramer-Mad;6-Money hedge fimd strategy. 
Introduction: 
CNBC hit a homerun with its decision to put Jim Cramer on 
the air. in all of his glory-hurling chairs across the floor, 
screa~mng at the came:a. ~nd ripping the heads off ofbull-shaped 
stress balls, and that IS m the first 5 minutes. A typical Mad 
Money show ~o~sists of Cramer starting off a pick of the day or 
week <;r descnbmg recent market news and its possible impacts. 
Later m the show, Cramer opens the lines up for callers to run 
their stock picks by Cramer. During this "lightnino- rou d" th 
· . ....., o n , e 
pace IS _fevenshly fast and "Booyah's" (Cramer's coined phrase 
for excitement and also a term of greeting) fill the air. Since its 
debut on !\larch 14.2005. Cramer's Mad Money has become one 
of the to~ ranked shows on CNBC. The times lot of 6 PM EST 
had ~revto~sly been the lowest-rated slot until Cramer showed 
up with a VIsion. His vision was for a show with one simple goal mak~ people money. According to Derek Hoggett, editor and 
pubhshero~Investn:entWizard.com, "JamesCramerisemerging 
as the most mfluential stock market o-uru sinceDanD rf d 
. ,· , e o manan 
Joe Granv1He. Can Cramer really pro vi· de above · k 
. . . -average, ns -
adJUSt~d returns for his viewers or is he dangerous to investors' 
financ1al health? 
This paper attempts to answer the question of whether Jim 
Cramer, utilizing his television venue, provides investors with a 
way to gain above-average, risk-adjusted returns. If Cramer is 
successful, then these results would challenge semi-strong fonn 
market efficiency theory. Semi-strong form market efficiency 
states that at any time stock market prices fully reflect all public 
infonnation. Following this, investors should not be able to 
make better returns than the market trading on information that 
is already publicly available. Cramer does not provide investors 
with proprietary information. The support he gives for his choice 
of stocks comes from a variety of sources such as press releases, 
company web sites, market news, and SEC filings. He is a major 
proponent of his viewers researching the companies he 
recommends before deciding to follow his advice. This paper 
contends, however, that regardless of following Cramer's do-
your-homework advice, investors can expect to see above-
average returns simply by buying when and what he says to buy 
and selling when and what he says to sell. 
This paper makes two contributions to current literature. 
First, it documents holding period returns that would have been 
achieved by following Jim Cramer's investment strategy. Second, 
this study has implications for future hedge fund strategies. 
Perhaps a hedge fund could repeatedly beat its competition in the 
growing market for hedge funds by following Cramer's 
investment advice and trading accordingly. This paper provides 
a jumping off point for other academics to continue the research 
and development of the probability and possible effects of a Jim-
Cramer-Mad-Money trading strategy. As will be discussed in 
Section 2.2 of the Literature Review, one other paper has 
attempted to document the results of Cramer's investment 
recommendations. This paper, however, takes a different slant 
than that of the Northwestern paper by investigating the different 
portions of the program (lightning round vs. non-lightning 
round) and hypothesizing that the two time periods are statistically 
significant from each other. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 
II discusses current relevant literature and the development of 
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the hypotheses for the study. Section III describes the sample 
selection and the design for this study. Section IV lays out the 
results of the study. Section V provides the results of the 
sensitivity analysis. Section VI concludes. 
Literature Review and Hypothesis Description: 
1. Efficient Market Theory 
Semi-strong form market efficiency states that at any time 
stock market prices fully reflect all public information. If this is 
true, investors should not be able to obtain above-average returns 
trading on information after it is made public. "This hypothesis 
implies that investors who base their decisions on any important 
new information"a.fter it is public should not derive above-
average risk-adjusted profits from their transactions" (Reilly & 
Brown, 2003). There is much disparity in the academic world as 
to whether the market truly is efficient at any level (strong, semi-
strong, or weak) and is still up for debate. IfFama is correct and 
stock prices fully reflect publicly available information, then 
there is no opportunity for individual investors to try to find gains 
in trading securities. Regardless of the academic support for 
EMH, the actions of many investors reveal that they believe 
market inefficiencies do exist and that there are opportunities for 
abnormal gains. While many believe that investors are naive to 
think they can actually beat the market because of its efficiency 
(Tam, 2002), individuals continue to tune in daily to Cramer's 
Mad Money looking for an advantage to do just that-beat the 
market. 
The efficient market hypothesis was first developed by 
Eugene Fama in 1965. He states that "in an efficient market, 
competition among the many intelligent participants leads to a 
situation where ... actual prices of individual securities already 
reflect the effects of information based ... on events that have 
already occurred" (1970). Fama's theory launched anew way of 
thinking about economic markets and led to much controversy. 
Perhaps the one puzzle in the discovery of whether the efficient 
market theory holds is whether investors really are intelligent as 
Fama surmises. 
In his paper, Daniel (1999) asserts that "self-confident 
individuals will appear to be more competent than individuals 
who are insecure about their own abilities." Jim Cramer presents 
himself as a self-confident individual. It is no wonder that 
investors catch on to this intoxicating energy and trust in his 
interpretations of market information. Could Cramer be too 
confident? Daniel supports his argument saying that 
overconfidence can have both a direct and indirect impact on 
how individuals process information. If investors adopt his 
overconfident attitude, they could overweight his suggestions 
and neglect to search their own base of knowledge to make the 
most intelligent investment decision. However, if they jump on 
the bandwagon too quickly they are not accurately following 
Cramer's advice. Cramer advises his viewership to "do their 
homework" and research a company before making the decision 
to buy the stock. This paper contends that regardless of following 
his do-your-homework advice, investors can gain positive returns 
by following his 1-want-you-to-buy-this-stock advice-perhaps 
investors are more intelligent than originally surmised if they arc 
already trading with Cramer's stock recommendations. 
2. Results ofOtlzer Event Studies 
Event studies are used to examine abnormal returns 
surrounding a particular economic event and provide a test for 
the EMH. Popular event study topics for testing semi-strong 
market efficiency theory include stock splits, initial public 
offerings (IPOs), exchange listings, unexpected world events 
and economic news, announcements of accounting changes. and 
corporate events. According to Reilly and Brown (2003) the 
evidence from tests of the semi-strong EMH draws mixed 
conclusions. Numerous event studies on a range of topics like 
stock splits, exchange listings, and initial public offerings provide 
support while numerous studies on predicting the expected 
return over time or for a cross section of stocks actually provide 
evidence count to semi-strong efficiency. 
However, there are multiple event studies that offer evidence 
to counter semi-strong market efficiency. One such study is that 
of Engelberg, Sasseville, and Williams (2006). They find that 
Cramer's recommendations do have an effect on stock prices in 
the short run concluding that Cramer's show caused mispricing 
in the market. Their findings document the existence of 
inefficiencies in the market-negating the semi-strong form 
market efficiency hypothesis. However, this study's findings 
differ from those of Engelberg, et al. because this study 
differentiates between the different portions of the television 
programs. This study also uses TheStreet.com as the primary 
data source, but Engelberg et al. used a different second-hand 
source other than the Personal Finance Blog discussed later in the 
paper. 
Two additional studies that tested the value of investment 
advice looked at the recommendations made through the Heard 
on the Streets (HOTS) column in the Wall Street Joumal. The 
first study was conducted by Davies and Canes (1978). They 
study the recommendations presented in the HOTS articles and 
found that the dissemination of information from a primary 
source (the analysts) to a public format can significantly affect 
stock prices. As a follow up to this study. Liu, Smith. and Syed 
( 1990) extend the study using a more recent sample. They also 
find that investment advice has economic value due to the 
observed abnormal returns for both buy and sell recommendations 
on the day of articles publication. 
3. Cramer's Reviews 
After Cramer graduated from Harvard in 1977, he began 
work as a journalist at the Los Angeles Herald Examiner. He 
returned to Harvard, received his Juris Doctor degree, and took 
a position with Goldman Sachs' Sales and Trading department. 
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He began his own hedge fund company (Cramer Berkowitz) 
with his partner Jeff Berkowitz in 1987. Though his hedge fund 
was hugely successful, Cramer left in 2000 citing anger-
management and stress issues as the dominant factor to his 
decision. Shortly after leaving Cramer Berkowitz, he began 
appearing as a host on'America Now and Kudlow & Cramer. 
After Kudlow & Cramer, Cramer began his own show which 
mixed his reputation for an anger-management problem and his 
stellar stock-picking record into a dynamite television program 
that has soared to the top of the charts. 
Cramer's Mad Money came under scrutiny on June 19, 
2005, when the New York Post printed an article by Richard 
Wilner entitled "Smart 'Money'? Cramer's Bark Worse Than 
Bite." The article explained that while Cramer's show is 
entertaining, it is not the best investment advice. Cramer 
responded to this article by offering his own,"'Cramer's Mad 
Money Record Speaks for Itself." In his article, Cramer provides 
the first week's worth of his recommendations and their results. 
He wraps up the article by saying"'I thought you would enjoy the 
actuals, though, and you might conclude that my bite and my 
bark are both pretty effective." The first week's worth of 
recommendations did look impressive, but that was not enough 
to keep those who doubt Cramer's success at bay. 
On February 27, 2006 TheStreet.com revealed that it and 
Cramer had received a subpoena from the SEC in response to 
stock manipulation allocations made by Overstock.com's CEO 
Peter Byrnes (Byrnes denied he was behind the SEC probe). The 
accusation is that a group of hedge fund managers and journalists 
conspired to drive down the stock price in order to gain from the 
stock's fall in price. Cramer responded by saying he was the 
target of the investigation because '·I said the stock was going 
lower. I didn't get the subpoena because I'm corrupt, I got it 
because I tried to get people out of a stock that we said was going 
lower. and went lower." He subsequently wrote bull on the 
subpoena and dropped it on the floor. 
Hypotheses Developmmt 
Based on the analysis of current literature and other relevant 
event studies. two hypotheses for this test were developed. The 
first hypothesis is as follows. 
Ho: investors can not gain above-average, risk-
adjusted returns for the 5 and 26 day trading 
windows by following the recommendations 
made by Jim Cramer during his CNBC show 
Mad Money 
H 1: investors can gain above-average, risk-
a~justed returns f~r the 5 and 26 day trading 
\\'111dows bywatchingMad Money and following 
the stock recommendations 
The second hypothesis was made by further dividing the 
data and distinguishing between when the recommendation was 
made during the program-either lightning round or non-lightning 
round. The hypothesis for this division was developed as 
follows. 
Ho: regardless of when the recommendation 
was made during the program, investors cannot 
expect to gain above-average, risk-adjusted 
returns for the 5 and 26 day trading windows 
H
1
: the two different segments of the program 
can gain the investor differing levels of above-
average, risk-adjusted returns for the 5 and 26 
day trading windows when one considers 
whether the recommendation was a buy or sell 
Sample selection and study design: 
The data for this test was collected from two internet data 
sources. The first and most reliable is TheStreet.com, a website 
co-founded by Jim Cramer. This website provides recaps of the 
daily shows from the most recent date back to June 28, 2005. For 
data earlier than June 28, I relied on the Personal Finance Blog 
(PFBlog.com) where a faithful viewer reviews in detail Cramer's 
daily recommendations. The variables I considered were the 
date of each show, company name, Cramer's position on the 
stock, and whether he was recommending the stock during the 
normal show time or the adrenaline-pumped lightning round. 
The data collection required some subjective decision making. 
In instances when it was difficult to distinguish, I relied on my 
ability to read his comments and decide whether he was bullish 
or bearish on the stock. The rule of thumb used was if he spoke 
about the stock in a positive light, it received a "buy" 
recommendation-alternatively, negative spins on a stock 
received a "sell" recommendation. 
The next step was to define the window of time. Since the 
show has only been on the air for a little over a year, the analysis 
would have to be short-term. This being the case, the decision 
was made to focus the analysis on 26-day trading window (five 
days prior to the event and twenty days after). Since Mad Money 
is a daily show, Cramer will often times repeat his recommendation 
for a stock within the created constraint of 25 days. Therefore, 
the process then became to remove "doubled-up" 
recommendations that could skew the results. Repeated 
recommendations were deleted unless Cramer changed his views 
on the stock, up to 25 days after the initial recommendation. 
After the 26-day window, the same recommendation on a stock 
was considered a unique event and included in the analysis. 
After controlling for repetition, there were 3,550 observations. 
The time period extended from Aprill9 to November 30, 2005. 
The data could not be extended beyond its end date since 20 days 
after the trade recommendation were required for the analysis. 
Also, data on stock prices and indices were only available 
through 2005. 
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After the time period of the study was established, the 
second set of data needed to be collected. This portion of the 
study included finding the stock returns for each company in 
Cramer's basket of recommendations as well as the returns for 
the value-weighted index, the proxy for the market's return. 
Through the University of Arkansas's subscription to Wharton 
Research Data Services (WRDS) the returns were accessed for 
the value-weighted index using datasets from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The value-weighted daily 
returns include all distributions, on a value-weighted market 
portfolio (excluding American Depository Receipts (ADRs)). 
All returns were found for the 26-day trading window. 
Since the alternative hypotheses of this paper are that 
investors can expect to earn above-average risk-adjusted returns, 
the daily returns of each stock had to be adjusted for the returns 
an investor could expect to make from investing in a portfolio of 
the market during the same time period. The cumulative abnormal 
returns were calculated for each of the 26 days surrounding the 
event as: 
Cumulative Abnormal Return== Portfolio Returnt 
- Return on Value-Weightedlndext(wheret=O 
is the recommendation event) 
The data underwent two tests of significance for the two 
time periods evaluated for the existence of short-term abnormal 
gains one could make from watching Mad Money. 
The first test looked at the entire 26-day trading window (5 
days before the event, the day of, and 20 days after). The second 
time period was forthe five days surrounding the recommendation 
event (two days before, the day of, and two days after). Tables 
I and 2 summarize the observations for the two time periods and 
the two tests for each hypothesis (buy and sell only and lightning 
round vs. non-lightning round). From the study, one can conclude 
that Jim Cramer's stock recommendations made during his 
television program, Mad Money, can gain investors cumulative 
abnormal returns. 
Results: 
The conclusion that investors can gain above-average, 
risk-adjusted returns is statistically significant at a 95'7c level of 
confidence. The variables were tested twice for the given 
hypotheses. The variables for the first test were all buy and sell 
recommendations. These variables were significantly different 
from each other with a p-value of less that 0.000 I for both time 
periods. The second set of tests determined the significant 
difference of lightning round buy and sell recommendations and 
non-lightning round buy and sell recommendations. For the 5-
day period variables were found to be significantly different 
from each other with p-values less than 0.000 I for all variables. 
The 26-day time period found statistically significant differences 
for all variables with the followingp-values: 0.0042 for lightning 
round buy vs. lightning round sell and 0.0002 for non-lightning 
round buy vs. non-lightning round sell. The final test compared 
lightning round and non-lightning round recommendations. 
These tests were significantly different at a 95% level of 
confidence only for the 5-day time period with p-values of less 
than 0.0001 for buys and 0.0059 for sells. Table 3 summarizes 
the significant difference for the variables in each time period 
test. 
Investors can earn abnormal returns from following 
Cramer's trading advice. They can expect to gain the highest 
returns by following his recommendations for a position on a 
stock during the non-lightning round portion of his show. Fort he 
26-window trading period, this class of recommendations 
averaged a 2.4% cumulative abnormal return as opposed to 1.4% 
fornon-lightning round recommendations. Sell recommendations 
made during the regular part of the show averaged -1.2%-for 
non-lightning round sell recommendations, the CAR was just 
over0.25%. The largestCAR(3.6%) occurred two days aftcrthe 
recommendation event for buys on stocks recommended during 
the non-lightning round portion. The second largest was the day 
before, or one day after the announcement. Following the second 
day, returns slowly begin to decrease dropping by a total of I% 
by the twenty-fifth trading day in the study for non-lightning 
round buy recommendations. Figure I illustrates the variables 
and cumulative abnormal returns. 
Another phenomenon witnessed within theses tests was 
that the CAR for the recommendations increases initially before 
the day of recommendation. There are many possible reasons 
why this is the case. One is that Cramer bases his recommendations 
off of the market news-information that is publici y available-
and the market is adjusting for this public information. Another 
possibility is that there is a leak in information. This conclusion 
concerns the idea that Cramer's recommendations actually affect 
the stock price which is a consideration that should be looked 
into in the future. The leak, therefore, means that investors trade 
with the expectation of being able to ride the change in stock 
price due to Cramer's recommendation. Regardless of the 
reason, investors are still able to gain returns thanks to Cramer's 
recommendations. 
Sensitivity Analysis/Robustness Check: 
For robustness. equally-weighted daily returns, including 
all distributions on an equally-weighted market portfolio 
(including ADRs), were also collected from CRSP. The 
cumulative abnormal returns were calculated for each of the 26 
days surrounding the event as: 
Cumulative Abnormal Return= Portfolio Return, 
-Return on Equally-Weighted Index, 
(where t=O is the recommendation event) 
Conclusions drawn from new test-; using this index instead 
of the Value-weighted index were similar to those based on the 
value-weighted index. 
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Conclusion: 
The energy of Cramer's show is invigorating. While his 
enthusiasm has developed many strong supporters and believers, 
he has also managed to draw plenty of criticism for his personal 
style and investment advice. He maintains, though, that the 
objective of the show is to make people money. As long as he 
remains loyal to the show's original purpose, he is doing his job 
to the bestofhisability. The resultsofthis study supportjustthat. 
There are some shortcomings of this study, though that could 
potentially diminish the returns an investor can expect to make. 
These factors include considerations like transaction costs and 
time concerns. Taking these factors into consideration could 
absolve any abnormal returns observed in the study. 
Even with the above considerations, the findings that 
investors can expect to gain above-average, risk-adjusted returns 
by following Cramer's recommendations on' Mad Money make 
a contribution to the research on the semi-strong form market 
efficiency hypothesis. If this hypothesis holds firm, investors 
can not expect to gain cumulative abnormal returns trading on 
information after it is made public-the information is already 
priced into the stock. However, this paper contends that not only 
can investors find gains in an inefficient market but they can gain 
these returns by following the recommendations made by Jim 
Cramer during his show Mad Money. Other studies, such as that 
conducted by a group of academics at Northwestern, also find 
that Cramer is able to provide investors with gains over those of 
the market. The findings of this paper, coupled with that of 
Northwestern, provide additional support that the market is not 
operating at a semi-strong form of market efficiency. These 
findings make contributions to the current literature by providing 
information about the returns gained from the different portions 
of the show. There are also implications for future research into 
the development of a hedge fund strategy based off of this 
assessment. 
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Table 1: Description of Data for 5-day and 26-day Trading Window Buy and Sell Recommendations Only Value-Weighted 
Index: 
This table provides the descriptive statistics for the entire data set. The two variables considered in this test were the cumulative 
abnormal returns for all buy and sell recommendations made by Cramer during Mad Money television broadcasts from Aprill9, 2005 
to November 30. 2005. Stock recommendations that were repeated within the 25-day limit are not included in the sample. The two 
time periods tested-the 5-day and 26-day trading windows-are represented in the following table. 
Recommendation Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum Sell CAR for 5 days 1661 -0.0029 -0.0023 0.0663 -0.5864 0.5713 
CAR for 26 days 0.0045 0.0043 0.1381 -0.8182 1.0170 
Buy CAR for 5 days 1889 0.0155 0.0073 0.0625 -0.1945 0.8581 
CAR for 26 days 0.0214 0.0152 0.1092 -Q.5453 0.8467 
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Table 2: Description of Data for 5-day and 26-day Trading Window Buy /Sell Recommendations and Lightning Round 
vs. Non-Lightning Round Value-Weighted Index 
This table provides the descriptive statistics for the entire data set. The four variables considered in this test were the cumulative 
abnormal returns for buy and sell recommendations made during lightning round and non-lightning segments for Mad Money 
broadcasts from Aprill9, 2005 to November 30,2005. Stock recommendations that were repeated within the 25-day limit arc not 
included in the sample. The two time periods tested-the 5-day and 26-day trading windows-arc represented in the following table. 
Recommendation Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Sell/Non-lightning Round CAR for 5 days 143 -0.0170 -0.0041 0.1034 -0.5864 0.4065 
CAR for 26 days -0.0174 -0.0093 0.1670 -0.8062 0.5735 
Sell/Lightning Round CAR for 5 days 1518 -0.0016 -0.0021 0.0616 -0.3081 0.5713 
CAR for 26 days 0.0065 0.0050 0.1350 -0.818 1.0170 
Buy/Non-lightning Round CAR for 5 days 473 0.0335 0.0168 0.0830 -0.1945 0.8581 
CAR for 26 days 0.0268 0.0206 0.1201 -0.5453 0.7738 
Buy/Lightning Round CAR for 5 days 1416 0.0094 0.0040 0.0526 -0.1860 0.6370 
CAR for 26 days 0.0196 0.0127 0.1052 -0.4348 0.8467 
Table 3: Test of Significant Difference for Cumulative Abnormal Returns Value-Weighted Index 
This table provides a summary of the test of significance for the variables under the two tests of the hypotheses. Panel A refers 
to the test for the first hypothesis (whether investors can gain cumulative abnormal returns by following the recommendations made 
by Jim Cramer during Mad Money). The remaining panels offer evidence for the second hypothesis (the returns investors can expect 
to gain are dependent upon during which segment of Mad Money the recommendation is made). The two time periods tested-the 
5-day and 26-day trading windows-are represented in the following table. 
Panel A: All Buy and All Sell Recommendations 
Variable N Buy 
CAR for 5 days 3550 0.0157 
CAR for 26 days 3550 0.0214 
Sell 
-0.0029 
0.0045 
Panel B: Lightning Round Buy and Sell Recommendations 
Variable N Buy Sell 
CAR for 5 days 2934 0.0094 -0.0016 
CAR for 26 days 2934 0.0196 0.0065 
Panel C: Non-lightning Round Buy and Sell Recommendations 
Variable N Buy Sell 
CAR for 5 days 616 0.0335 -0.0170 
CAR for 26 days 616 0.0268 -0.0174 
Difference 
0.0184 
0.0169 
Difference 
0.0110 
0.0131 
Difference 
0.0504 
0.0441 
Lightning Round Buy vs. Non-lightning Round Buy Recommendations 
Variable N Lightning Non-lightning Difference 
CAR for 5 days 
CAR for 26 days 
1889 
1889 
Round Round 
0.0094 0.0335 
0.0196 0.0268 
-0.0240 
-0.0072 
Panel E: Lightning Round Sell vs. Non-lightning Round Sell Recommendations 
Variable N Lightning Non-lightning Difference 
CAR for 5 days 
CAR for 26 days 
1661 
1661 
Round Round 
-0.0016 -0.0170 
0.0065 -0.0174 
0.0154 
0.0239 
p-value 
<.0001 
<.0001 
p-value 
<.0001 
0.0042 
p-value 
<.0001 
0.0002 
Panel D: 
p-value 
<.0001 
0.2730 
p-value 
0.0059 
0.0271 
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Figure 1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for 5-day and 26-day Trading Window Value-Weighted Index 
This figure provides a visual interpretation of the data analyzed in the study. The time period analyzed is five da~s b~fore the 
recommendation event and twenty days after. The recommendation event day is time 0. The six variables represented Ill ~h1s figure 
are the two for the first hypothesis (whether investors can gain abnormal returns) which are all buy and sell recommendations m~de 
and the four variables for the second hypothesis (the amount of gain investors can expect to gain depends on when the recommendatiOn 
was given during the show) which are buy and sell recommendations made during lightning round and non-lightning round portions 
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Mentor comments: 
Dr. Craig Rennie made the following remarks about Ms. 
Dodson's research: 
As Elizabeth Dodson's thesis advisor, I strongly 
recommend Elizabeth's research on Jim Kramer's 
Mad Money recommendations for publication in 
Inquiry. Her paper makes a material contribution to 
the empirical investments finance literature dealing 
with efficient markets and asset pricing by 
investigating the effectiveness of investment 
recommendations made bv the immenselv successful 
CNBC investments com~entator of a hit TV show. 
Traditionally, there has been debate in the academic 
investments finance literature about semi-strong form 
market efficiency. Prior literature generally shows 
investments recommendations from newsletters and 
other commentators generate marginally superior 
returns, but not necessarily after transaction costs are 
taken into account. · 
Elizabeth's research extends this work in a new way 
by investigating the effectiveness of recommendations 
made by a widely followed CNBC commentator who 
is a highly experienced former hedge fund manager. 
Only one other working paper exists on this topic, but 
it fails to differentiate between Jim Kramer's own 
recommendations and his commentary in the 
"lightning round" where he responds to questions 
from call-ins. Elizabeth notes that Jim Kramer's 
recommendations could predict stock price 
movements, or cause stock price movements. \Vhat 
matters to investors is that his recommendations can 
be used to achieve abnormal stock returns. 
Importantly, Elizabeth's findings of almost a 3 percent 
abnormal return over a short term holding period are 
striking. Her research can be used by investors to 
realize abnormal stock returns. Her results also cast 
furtherdoubtonthesemi-strongformeffidentmarkets 
hypothesis. 
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